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Termination Rights and the Real
Songwriters
By Geoffrey P. Hull*
Collaboration- the act of more than
one songwriter writing a song-has seldom,
if ever, been more popular or prevalent in
popular music. A perusal of a recent Billboard
Hot 100 singles chart revealed that 85 of the
charted songs had more than one writer in
their credits. Of the fifteen with single writer
credits, thirteen were by the recording artists.
The other two were remakes of decades-old
hits.1 More often than not, especially on the
pop charts, some of the co-writers are the
recording artists or the producers of the
recording. Many times these artist and
producer co-writers have actually written part
of the song. Other times, however, they may
have been involved in a deal that granted cowriter credits in exchange for recording the
song. What are the implications of the
creation of phony co-writer status for the
copyright ownership and for the rights of the
"real" authors? This Article attempts to
unravel the situation created by overreaching

I. Co-Authorship in Songwriting

The extent to which producers, artists,
label executives, and others may demand
writer credits and shares of copyrights in
return for recording a song is'difficult to
determine. It is clear that the practice is
longstanding. Al Jolson reportedly got onethird writer credit and income on the song
"California Here I Come," though the song
was actually written by Buddy DeSylva and
Joe Meyer.2 ASCAP lists 43 compositions with
Jolson as a co-writer. 3 Elvis Presley's Presley
Music and Gladys Music were created so that
Elvis could own the publishing rights to songs
he recorded, or could become a co-writer as
well. Elvis' rights in "Heartbreak Hotel" were
likely a result of this arrangement. 4 BMI lists
5
22 compositions with Presley as a co-writer.
Record label executives George Goldner of
Gee Records and Morris Levy of Big Seven
Music/Roulette Records listed themselves as
authors
on
copyright
"Al Jolson reportedly got oneregistrations of
"Why Do Fools
third writer credit and income
Fall in Love,"
on the song "California Here I
even though
neither was a
6
Come," though the song was
"true" author.
BMI
lists
actually written by Buddy
Goldner as a
writer or coDeSylva and Joe Meyer."
writer on 4b
compositions
and Levy as coartists and producers. It argues that "real"
authors have a remedy to get their copyrights writer on three compositions. More recently,
back by utilizing the statutory right of the New York Post reported that Celine Dion
and her husband/manager were demanding
termination of transfers.
Spring 2005
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20 percent of publishing royalties for putting
songs on the "Let's Talk About Love" album.7
Songwriter Jimmy Webb, writer of "By The
Time I Get to Phoenix," "Up, Up and Away,"
"The Worst That Could Happen," "Mac Arthur
Park," and "Wichita Lineman" recounts,
On one occasion I sat at the piano and
played a song for a staff producer who
made a couple of diffident suggestions
- one of which I thought was not too
bad, and which I subsequently
incorporated rather absentmindedly
into the finished product. He recorded
the song, sang it himself, had the
recording pressed up before I knew it,
and there under the song's title in
parentheses, his name was included
with mine [as a co-writer]. 8
This Business of Music notes, "Some
dissatisfied publishers claim they are forced to
share copyrights with recording stars and
record company publishing affiliates, and that
this is akin to payola; however the practice
appears uncoerced from a legal point of view."9
It suggests that a contractual "cut-in" share of
royalties for artists or labels in publishing
income is preferable to a "co-writing" credit or
co-ownership of the copyright. "Asking for a
cut-in is not the same as demanding to be
named a co-writer of the composition to obtain
a share of the writer credits and payments from
ASCAP or BMI [or SESAC]. The latter practice
may constitute a fraudulent registration in the
Copyright Office."10 Part IV, below, discusses
the possible effects of such a fraudulent
registration.
These
scenarios
suggest
situations

two

or producer's publishing company. In one
instance, the original writer may have agreed
to, or at least tacitly accepted, the other party's
presence, perhaps as an incentive to get a
producer or artist to record the song. In the
other, the original writer did not agree to other
party's partial copyright ownership; the other
party simply inserted his or her name in the
copyright registration or album credits as a
writer.
If the music publisher to whom the
original writer transferred copyright ownership
in exchange for royalties cuts in, or shares, the
publisher's share of copyright ownership or
earnings with a third party, then the author
initially should have no objection. Such
arrangements would not usually reduce the
writer's standard fifty percent share of the
publishing revenues. On the other hand, if the
original writer finds that the recording artist or
producer demands a share of the credits and
rights as a songwriter or publisher to get the
song recorded, then the original writer is at a
disadvantage. Faced with the superior
bargaining and gate-keeping power of an artist
or producer, the original writer must either
share writer credits and royalties or look
elsewhere to get the song recorded. For songs
that have already become hits, the writers could
probably find other outlets for their recordings.
The same is not true for previously unrecorded
songs of undetermined value, where the original
writer has almost no choice other than to allow
the artist or producer to be listed as a co-writer
and give up a share of the earnings. With the
duration of copyright now lasting generally for
life of the author plus seventy years," or 95

"If the recording artist or
producer does not create any
of the song, then they cannot
be authors. in the strict
Constitutional sense of the

where someone
other than the
original writer
of a song later
becomes a cowriter in name
only, obtains
some or all of
the publishing rights on the song, or gets a split
of revenues or music publishing with the artist's

word,"
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years for works created and published before
1978,12 songwriters may not have an option.
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There is,
however,
a
"A more difficult question is the
mechanism in
the copyright
extent to which a contribution
law that should
must be made by a putative
enable
the
original writer
co-author in order for that person
to recapture the
e n t i r e
to be accorded the status of a'joint
copyright, even
author.' "
though these
recording
artists
and
producers claim shares of the copyrights as their contributions, unless there is some written
writers when they are not. If the artists and indication to the contrary. In Papa's-JuneMusic,
producers are not really joint authors, as will Inc. v. McLean, the court held that Harry
be explored below, then they must be licensees Connick, Jr. and Ramsey McLean owned equal
or transferees. If that is the case, then their shares in the works in question because there
rights to utilize the work are subject to statutory was no agreement prior to their creation that
termination of transfers by the original writer(s) the shares were to be anything other than
or their heirs under the termination of transfers equal. ' 9 In past collaborations, McLean and
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976.13
Connick agreed to split their ownership 30/70,
respectively.20 The court noted that a split other
A.
Co-writing and Joint than 50/50 constituted a transfer of copyright
21
Authorship
ownership and, as such, had to be in writing.
It is quite common, especially in McLean had made Connick aware that he
musical compositions, for more than one wanted to alter the arrangement for the songs
author to be involved in the creation of the in question, but Connick proceeded to assume
work. In most of these situations, the a 30/70 split, asserting an oral agreement on
definitions of the Copyright Act regard them the previous split. 22 In requiring a written
as "joint authors." A "joint work" is one agreement, Judge Cedarbaum stated,
"prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged
An author can mistakenly or
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
fraudulently claim an oral transfer of
14
unitary whole."
The legislative history
copyright ownership from his joint
suggests that, when one songwriter creates the
author. If joint authors are forced to
words to a song and another creates the music,
put their agreement into writing, there
they would be creating joint works because
is less opportunity for fraud or mistake.
their works are designed to be interdependent
Moreover, if an agreement to alter the
parts of a whole.' 5 Certainly, when both writers
statutory presumptions of equal
contribute to both parts of a song, they would
ownership and equal right to license and
be creating a joint work. A song may be
perform the joint work is put into
considered a joint work even where a lyricist
writing, the authors will have less need
wrote the words before he knew the identity of
to resort to the courts to resolve disputes
the composer, as long as that is what he had
about the terms of their mutual
6
intended.'
understanding. 23
Once the work is deemed to be "joint,"
there are several presumptions that take effect. As co-owners, they may not sue each other for
Joint authors are generally treated similarly to infringement because each has a right to utilize
tenants in common. 7 The statute itself terms the work.
them as "co-owners" of the copyright.' 8 Their
A critical fact examined in questions of
shares are presumed to be equal, not related to joint works is the intention of the authors. The
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statute requires that they have the "intention
that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole. ' 24 The legislative history, court
decisions, and commentators all underscore
the importance of the intent of the authors. The
House Report notes:
The touchstone here is the intention, at
the time the writing is done, that the
parts be absorbed or combined into an
integrated unit, although the parts

court stated, "What distinguishes the writereditor relationship and writer-researcher
relationship from the true joint author
relationship is the lack of intent of both
participants in the venture to regard
themselves a joint authors. 31 In the case of
the producer or recording artist asking to be
considered co-writers, if the actual writer agrees
both parties may intend that the producer or
recording artist be considered a co-writer, but
that intention did not exist at the time the work
was created. Furthermore, the expression of
"intent"
the
takes the form of
an "agreement"

recording artist
or
recorfn
producer is not an "author"
6eth

forced on the
original author
by overreaching
on the part of
the putative couhri in a
author
situation where
is
there
incredibly
unequal
bargaining power. On the other hand, if a
writer took a mostly completed song to a
recording artist or producer "intending" to
finish it with the other person as a co-writer, a
court would likely find the requisite intent to
create a joint work.

within the m eaning of the
copyright act.."'
..
a,

themselves may be either 'inseparable'
(as the case of a novel or painting) or
'interdependent' (as in the case of a
motion picture, opera, or the words and
music of a song). 5
Nimmer, for instance, states that, generally,
there cannot be an implied agreement to create
a joint work after one of the parts has been
completed because there was no intention on
the part of the first author to do so at the time
of creation.26 The House Report even posits
the example that one writing a song or novel
with the hope that it will be used for a motion
picture does not become a joint author of the
motion picture because the song or novel is a
separate work of authorship created prior to
the movie. 27 The leading cases of Childress v.
Taylor28, Thomson v. Larson29, and Almuhammed
v. Lee 30 all focus on the intent of the putative
co-authors at the time of the writing. In those
cases, the collaboration and contributions were
made at the time of writing. In Childress and
Thomson, the contributions were of a
dramaturge; in Almuhammed, they were of a
researcher for Spike Lee's movie of the
Autobiography of Malcolm X. In Childress, the
Spring 2005

Fake Co-Writers as Joint
Authors
B.

The Constitution grants Congress the
32
power to protect the writings of "authors."
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the term
"author" means "he to whom anything owes
its origin. ' ' 33 More specifically, the Court has
noted, "[als a general rule, the author is the
party who actually creates the work, that is,
the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright
protection." 34 If the recording artist or producer
does not create any portion of the song, then
they cannot be authors in the strict,
constitutional sense of the word.
Courts and commentators have all
concluded that there must be some kind of
"authorship" contribution in order to be
considered an "author." Nimmer states, "the
contribution must be one of authorship in

Termination Rights and the Real Songwriters
copyright law to oblige all joint authors to make
copyrightable contributions, leaving those with
non-copyrightable contributions to protect
41
their rights through contract."
In a case that applied the Goldstein
principle to musical works, the court in BTE v.
Bonnecaze42 held that 'Better Than Ezra's' former
drummer could not claim a share of the group's
song copyrights unless he had contributed
something beyond "ideas" and "working up"
the song so that it could be recorded. The court
observed that other courts had adopted the
Goldstein test, noting, "[tihe insistence on
copyrightable contributions by all putative joint
authors might
serve to prevent
some spurious
writer who is not icJentified as
claims by those
who
might
sucn on the reg.stration must prove
otherwise try to
that he is an author. Similarly,
share the fruits
actual authors have to disprove that
of the efforts of a
sole author of a
someone who is listed as an author
copyrightable
work ....
,,43 This
is not actually an author."
test "evidences a
desire to limit
the claims 'of
'
be accorded the status of a "joint author." The 'overreaching' contributors."
Similarly, the recording artist's
joint author status is significant since joint
authors own equal shares of the copyrights. interpretive variations in the recorded
Although neither the courts nor commentators performance
would not qualify as
require equal contributions, the prevailing view copyrightable
contributions
to
the
is that the contributors must make separate, composition. The mechanical license typically
copyrightable contributions in order to have a used by the record companies to record and
claim for joint author status. 37 This is the view distribute copies of a recording either
expressed by Paul Goldstein 3 and adopted by incorporates by reference the provisions of the
the Second Circuit in the leading joint compulsory mechanical license of 17 U.S.C.
authorship case of Childress v. Taylor.3 9 In that §115, or alters them in part to suit the record
case, Taylor, who came up with the idea of a companies' desires to reduce the statutory rate
play about the life of comedienne "Moms" or alter the accounting provisions. In either
Mabley, could not be a joint author simply event, the typical license and statutory
because she had contributed the initial idea for provisions preclude one from considering a
the play and ideas for some of the scenes. "Care performer's stylistic variations as copyrightable
must be taken," said the court, "to ensure that because such variations comprise a derivative
true collaborators in the creative process are work; thus, they are generally excluded from
accorded the perquisites of co-authorship and the license. A typical negotiated license states,
to guard against the risk that a sole author is "The license includes the privilege of making a
denied exclusive authorship status simply musical arrangement of the Composition to the
because another person rendered some form extent necessary to conform it to the style or
manner of interpretation of the performance
of assistance." 4 The court concluded, that "[lit
seems more consistent with the spirit of involved, but the arrangement made (i) may
order to constitute the contributor a joint
author. For instance, one who merely
contributes financing should not, by reason of
such fact, be entitled to claim as a joint
author." 3- Thus, one court concluded that a
producer who "'made no musical or artistic
contribution' to the tapes [and] did not serve
as the engineer at the sessions or direct the
manner in which the songs were played or
sung" could not be a joint author of a
36
recording.
A more difficult question is the extent
to which a contribution must be made by a
putative co-author in order for that person to

I"A
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not change the basic melody or fundamental
character of the lyrics of the composition, (ii)
shall not be subject to protection under the Act
by Licensee as a derivative work .... ,,45 This
mirrors the statutory language of the
46
compulsory license provision.
Approaching this question from the
other direction, i.e., looking at what might
constitute a derivative work in the first place,
the prevailing view is perhaps summarized in
Woods v. Bourne Co., 4 7 in which Bourne claimed
that a piano edition of a song was sufficient to
make it a derivative work and, hence, immune
from termination under the derivative works
exception. The Court in Woods stated:
In order therefore to qualify as a
musically 'derivative work,' there must
be present more than mere cocktail
pianist variations of the piece that are
standard fare in the music trade by any
competent musician. There must be
such things as unusual vocal treatment,
additional lyrics of consequence,
unusual altered harmonies, novel
sequential uses of themes -something
of substance added making the piece
to some extent a new work with the old
song embedded in it but from which
the hew has developed. It is not merely
a stylized version of the original song
where a major artist may take liberties
with the lyrics or the tempt, the listener
48
hearing basically the original tune.
Thus, the recording artist or producer is not an
"author" within the meaning of the copyright
act because (1) they did not make a
copyrightable contribution to the musical
composition, and/or (2) it was not the intent of
the actual author at the time of creation of the
work that the producer or recording artist be a
joint author. Falsely claiming authorship on
the copyright registration form cannot create
status as an author.

C. The Effect of a Registration
Showing the Phony Author
as a Co-Author
Unlike the Patent Office, the Copyright
Office does not actually grant copyrights.
Rather, copyright protection begins upon the
Spring 2005

creation of the work, i.e., "when it is fixed in a
copy of phonorecord for the first time."49 The
act of registration of the work with the
Copyright Office is permissive and, as the
statute says, "not a condition of copyright
protection.."5 0 Registration does provide the
copyright holder with certain advantages,
however. If completed within five years of first
publication, the registration is prima facie
evidence of the validity of.the copyright and of
the facts stated in the registration certificate
(which is simply a copy of the application
form)."' Registration may be completed at any
time during the life of the copyright, but is
required of works that originate in the United
States in order to sue for infringement. 2 For a
successful plaintiff to obtain statutory damages
or attorney's fees, a registration must be made
within three months of publication or before
the infringement took place.5 3
While registration and the content of
the registration application is important, it is
not entirely determinative. The Copyright
Office does not make determinations of
ownership based on the registration claims, as
there would be no reliable way to determine
the validity of authorship statements.5 4 The
Copyright Act requires only that the Copyright
Office determine that the material "constitutes
copyrightable subject matter and that the other
legal and formal requirements of this title have
been met ....,,5- At that point, the register
"shall" issue the certificate of registration. As
one court put it, "[r]egistration does not
56
determine ownership.
Since there is no actual determination
of authorship at the time of registration,
considering the registration form prima facie
evidence shifts the burden of proof to the party
claiming that the facts are contrary to those
indicated on the registration form. A writer
who is not identified as such on the registration
must prove that he is an author. Similarly,
actual authors must disprove the claim that
someone who is listed as an author is not
actually an author.5 ' Goldstein notes that the
presumption of the validity of the facts is not
as strong as that of the validity of the
copyright. 58 Furthermore, the presumption
"merely orders the burdens of proof. The
plaintiff should not ordinarily be forced in the
first instance to prove all of the multitude of
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facts that underline the validity of the copyright
unless the defendant, by effectively challenging
them, shifts the burden of doing so to the
plaintiff." 59 In Merchant v. Lymon,6 ° for
example, the court considered whether a record
producer who regularly put his name as an
author on copyright registrations could be
considered an owner. It noted that a pattern of
consistently claiming to be an author on other
works that he had not created was evidence
that enabled the jury to rebut the presumption
of authorship as stated in the registration forms.
Even so, there is the practical matter that
evidence as to who wrote a particular
composition may be difficult to produce
twenty-five to forty years 61 after the original
fact. 62 A demonstration recording prior to the
putative writer's exposure to the work would
be good evidence. Testimony of others who
heard the song being performed by the actual
writers may also be good evidence.

period of five years beginning at the end of fiftysix years from the date the copyright was
originally secured, or beginning on January 1,
1978, whichever is later." 65 The Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act 66 in 1998 added
an additional termination provision for pre1978 works whose termination period had
expired and the author or other termination
rights owners had not previously exercised the
termination right. 67 For those works, an
additional five-year termination period begins
"at the end of 75 years from the date copyright
was originally secured."6 8 For transfers
executed on or after January 1, 1978, only those
made by the author are subject to
termination. 69 For transfers made prior to
January 1, 1978, those executed by the author,
the author's surviving widow or widower,
children, grandchildren or a deceased author's
executor,
administrator,
personal
representative, or trustee are subject to
termination. 70 If the transfer was testamentary,
it is not terminable in either case. The actual
II. Termination Rights
wording of the statute is that transfers
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives authors "otherwise than by will" are subject to
a non-transferable right to terminate transfers termination. 71
In neither case do the
(which term includes assignments and termination provisions apply to works made
exclusive licenses) 63 and non-exclusive licenses for hire. 72 That is one of the reasons why, as
of the copyrights in their works during a five the House Report explains, the definition of
year period that begins after 35 years from the works made for hire in the 1976 Act is so
73
date of the execution of the grant and runs important.
through 40 years after the date of execution of
Two details of the termination
the grant. If the grant involves the right to provisions are particularly crucial to the current
publish the work, the termination right begins discussion. In the case of joint works, for
after 40 years after the grant or 35 years after transfers made on or after January 1, 1978,
first publication, whichever ends earlier. 64 For "termination of the grant may be effected by a
majority of the
who
authors
"Not only would t he actual
,74
executed it....
songwriter be precli ided from
The legislative
history
is clear
getting a full share of thiBcopyrights
that
the

upon termination, they %rould also be
precluded from even ge tting half of
the copyrights through a termination
proceeding"
works whose federal copyrights were subsisting
before January 1, 1978, "[t]ermination of the
grant may be effected at any time during a

requirement of a
of
majority
ownership of
the termination
interest agree to
terminate
a
transfer means
something more than fifity percent ownership
of the termination intere st. 75 If the songwriter
and recording artist were actually joint authors,
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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this would require that both of them act to requires some affirmative action on the part of
terminate any transfer.76 If, for example, the the terminating parties (i.e., notice to the
phony artist/authors had transferred copyrights transferee or licensee whose rights are being
to publishing companies they owned, then the terminated), "the right to take this action
actual songwriter could not terminate such a cannot be waived in advance or contracted
82
transfer without the consent of the artist. Not away." An author/songwriter's agreement to
only would the actual songwriter be precluded treat someone who has not in fact authored any
from getting a full share of the copyrights upon portion of the song as a co-writer can certainly
termination, the songwriter would also be be viewed as an "agreement to the contrary."
precluded from getting even half of the It operates to cut off the termination right
copyrights through a termination proceeding because the act of creating the work does not
if the phony "authorship" of the artist or involve any transfer of ownership that could
producer stands. This would doubly thwart be terminated.
This provision has only been
authors
the congressional purpose of protecting
77
transfers.
significantly litigated once since passage of the
against unremunerative
83
For transfers made before January 1, 1976 Act. In Marvel Characters,Inc. v. Simon
1978, an individual author, or their statutory the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
may
heirs,
a
terminate
transfer of that
"From the beginning of the
author's share of
copyright law revision process in
the copyrights.78
This is different
1965, Congress sought to provide
from the Section
203 provision,
authors with some means to
which requires
against
protect themselves
that the transfer
'unremunerative transfers'..."
of the entire
be
interest
terminated

.

79

The legislative
history indicates that this intentional difference
is because Congress viewed the renewal rights
as creating separate and new "estates." "It
would therefore be inappropriate to impose a
requirement of majority action with respect to
transfers executed by two or more joint
authors."80 For pre-1978 transfers, the actual
songwriters or their heirs would at least be able
to recapture the actual songwriter's share of the
copyrights, even if the status of the phony
author stood.
A second significant provision is that
"[t]ermination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary,
including an agreement to make a will or to
make any future grant. ' 81 Identical language
appears in both the Section 203 and 304
termination provisions. Reflecting on the
"practical compromise" of the Section 203
provisions, the House Report states that
although termination is not automatic and
Spring 2005

a settlement agreement entered into in 1969
which stated that Simon had created the
Captain America comic hero as a work made
for hire was an "agreement to the contrary."
The District Court was therefore incorrect in
granting summary judgment to Marvel on the
issue of work made for hire because Simon had
submitted evidence that he was the author and
had created the work prior to any relationship
with Marvel.84 In reaching that conclusion, the
Second Circuit examined the legislative history
of Section 304(c) and concluded that an
agreement that a work was made for hire
entered into after the work was created,
would thwart the clear legislative
purpose and intent of the statute. If an
agreement between an author and
publisher that a work was created for
hire were outside the purview of §
304(c)(5), the termination provision

Termination Rights and the Real Songwriters
response to an author's legitimate
exercise of his termination rights.
Permitting such an exception, however,
would contravene the plain language,
intent, and purpose of § 304(c). 91

would be rendered a nullity; litigationsavvy publishers would be able to utilize
their superior bargaining position to
compel authors to agree that a work was
created for hire in order to get their
works published.a

From the beginning of the copyright law
The court also found support in Mills Music, revision process in 1965, Congress sought to
Inc. v. Snyder 6 that the clear intent of the provide authors with some means to protect
termination provisions in general was to protect themselves against "unremunerative transfers"
authors from "ill-advised and unremunerative made prior to any determination of the true
grants that had been made before the author value of the work.92 That purpose has been
had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true recognized in virtually every court opinion that
value of his work product."8 7 Similarly, the has addressed termination rights. In Mills
court found support in Nimmer on Copyright, Music, the Supreme Court noted:
which concludes that parties cannot agree that
[t]he termination right was expressly
a work was created for hire when in fact it was
intended to relieve authors of the
not, because such an agreement would be an
"agreement to the contrary" that could be
consequences of ill-advised and
8
8
unremunerative grants that had been
terminated. An after-the-fact agreement that
made before the author had a fair
someone else is an author, when in fact they
opportunity to appreciate the true value
are not, should be no less terminable than an
of his work product. That general
after-the-fact work for hire agreement, or even
purpose is plainly defined in the
a settlement stipulation. Although Marvel
legislative history and, indeed, is fairly
contended that upsetting the settlement
93
inferable from the test of § 304 itself.
stipulation would open floodgates of litigation,
the court noted, "[i]f the parties intend to
preclude any future litigation regarding The often cited House Report language on the
authorship by settling their claims, they need subject states, "[a] provision of this sort is
only comply with the requirements of collateral needed because of the unequal bargaining
estoppel by filling a detailed stipulation of position of authors, resulting in part from the
settlement, complete with sufficient factual impossibility of determining a work's value until
89
Of it has been exploited." 94 The leading treatises
findings on authorship, with the court.
course, factual findings that the phony author also recognize this important function of the
is in fact an author would not be possible termination rights.95 Nimmer specifically notes,
because the works would have been created "[t]he entire thrust of the termination
by the songwriter before the artist or producer procedures is to protect authors given their
unequal bargaining posture." 96
entered the picture.
The Supreme Court has considered the
The Marvel court went even further,
of the termination provisions of
implications
estoppel
equitable
ruling that the doctrine of
9
Even though the 1976 Act twice since its passage. In Mills
"does not supercede § 304(c)."
the authorship claims may relate to "long Music, the Court balanced competing interests
dormant copyright ownership issues," said the of an author (songwriter's heirs), the author's
transferee of rights (music publisher), and the
court,
creators of derivative works (record companies)
[i]n fact, Congress's goal in providing whose rights were received through a grant
authors with this termination rights from the author's original grantee.9 7 In Stewart
was to enable them to reclaim long lost v. Abend, the Court analyzed the termination
copyright grants. As the district court provisions to shed light on a film company's
correctly recognized, virtually every argument that renewal of copyright under the
copyright holder could fashion a similar 1909 law should not cut off the rights of the
equitable estoppel argument in creator of a derivative work to utilize that work
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application to
the recording industry in Mills
Music, the Supreme
Court
specifically considered
the
proposition that
record compa(
nies create derivative works
(sound recordings) of musical
after renewal. 98 In Stewart the Court took compositions and that they deserve to be aljudicial note of the fact that the termination lowed to continue to use those recordings, deprovisions embodied in the 1976 Act were the spite a termination of the transfer of rights beresult of compromises between various tween the songwriter and the music publisher.
competing interests; when the agreement on 106 Typically, the songwriter transfers the copythe compromise was reached, the debate all but rights to the music publisher in exchange for
ended. 99 Therefore, said the Court, "the process royalties and possibly advances. The publisher
of compromise between competing special then licenses others, including record compainterests leading to the enactment of the 1976 nies, to utilize the work in exchange for royalAct undermines any such attempt to draw an ties that are usually shared equally with the
overarching policy out of... [the termination songwriter. The question in Mills Music was
provision]."' 0 0 That same compromise was whether, following a termination of the transnoted in Mills Music'01 and Community for fer from the songwriter to the music publisher,
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 10 2 The highly the music publisher could continue to collect
negotiated compromise made the Court the license fees from the record company for
reluctant to read into these parts of the statute recordings made prior to the termination or
any applications that are not clearly apparent whether the record company had to pay those
on the face of the statute or in the legislative royalties directly to the songwriter.' 7 If the lathistory. This reluctance would operate to the ter was the case, the publisher would not be
detriment of the artist or producer as a able to collect their fifty percent as they had
designated, but not actual, co-writer. They are prior to the termination. Drawing a parallel to
not
"authors"
who
have
made the large investment that motion picture pro"unremunerative" transfers and need to be ducers
make in creating a motion picture based
protected. Rather, they are the persons who on a play or novel, the Court said, "record comcaused the songwriter to make the panies must also make a significant investment
unremunerative transfer in the first place.
in compensating vocalists, musicians, arrangers, and recording engineers." 10 8 This protection allowed the public to benefit because the
III. The Derivative Works Excep- derivative work creator had made substantial
tion
investment to bring the public a new form or
The statutory termination provisions for version of the original work. It ensured that
pre-1978 works 0 3 and post-1978 works'0 4 con- the derivative work could continue to be availtain identical language that protects the creators able and exploited even after a termination of
of derivative works. A derivative work "pre- the transfer to the publisher. 0 9 The Court conpared under authority of the grant before its cluded that because the recordings made by
termination may continue to be utilized under record companies were derivative works based
the terms and conditions of the grant after its upon the songs recorded, the derivative works
termination."1 5 In its exploration of the his- exception allowed the record companies to contory of the termination provisions and their tinue to utilize their recordings created prior to

"In the case of a recording artist or
producer
falsely
claiming
authorship, the link to the original
writers through the publisher can
still be preserved.., even if the link
to the name-only writers is)
severed."
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missing, and the record companies will
the termination.11 ° If the record companies
have no contractual obligation to pay
could continue to utilize their works, the Court
royalties to the Snyders. If the statute
reasoned, the "terms and conditions" under
is read to preserve the total contractual
which they could use the work must include
relationship, which entitled Mills to
the continued payment to the music publisher.
make duly authorized derivative works,
The music publisher would then continue to
the record companies continue to be
pay half of the royalties collected to the Snyders,
bound by the terms of their licenses,
the songwriter's heirs."'
including any terms requiring them to
How does that interpretation apply to
continue to pay royalties to Mills. 112
the situation where the transfer being
terminated is one that had been made to a
In the case of a recording artist or
recording artist or producer to persuade them
to make a recording of the song? There are producer falsely claiming authorship, the link
two possible outcomes, both of which allow to the original writers through the publisher
the record company to continue to be able to can still be preserved, as Mills Music requires,
use
their
derivative work.
"In cases invc lving claims of ownerOnly one of
ship, the cou rts tend to view the
them
causes
royalties to be
accrual of thne cause of action as
paid through
the publisher to
taking place uipon the initial publicaoriginal
the
tion where co pyright ownership and
writer
only,
while the other
authorship m
ay be claimed on the
outcome directs
a
published cop ies."
payment
of
royalties to the
original writer
and the name-only writers. As discussed below, even if the link to the name-only writers is
the language of the Mills Music decision appears severed. Terminating a transfer of partial
to support the continued flow of royalties to ownership rights to the recording artist would
both actual and name-only writers for not sever the link between the original writers
and the record labels. Since the record
recordings made prior to the termination.
The license that allows the record company, not the artist or producer, has
company to make a recording of a song, a obtained the license and created the derivative
mechanical license, comes from the copyright work, there is no reason to allow the nameowner of the musical composition, the music only writers to continue to be able to collect
publisher. The decision in Mills Music royalties. The purpose of protecting the public
preserved the grant from the writer to the by making sure that the derivative work will
publisher and the grant from the publisher to still be available is served. The purpose of
the label. Otherwise, said the Court, the protecting the investment made by the record
songwriters had no right to collect any royalties company is also preserved. Both of these goals
of the derivative works exception are achieved
at all from the labels. It explained,
even though the recording artist or producer
[Iff the Exception [derivative works may no longer have any rights. The purpose
exception] is narrowly read to exclude of protecting the writers from unremunerative
[the publisher] from its coverage, thus transfers is better served by this result-a result
protecting only the class of 'utilizers' as that the Court recognized as a "principal
the Snyders [the writer's heirs] wish, the purpose" of the termination right."3
The decision in Mills Music was five to
crucial link between the record
Most
companies and the Snyders will be four over a strong dissent." 4
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commentators have concluded that the Court to the termination. Perhaps the royalties
incorrectly analyzed the legislative history, or should be limited to those from the derivative
perhaps the lack of clear legislative history, and work that they created. However, since neither
that the dissent was closer to being correct." 5 they nor their publisher could issue any more
One concluded,
"The
Court
nonetheless [in
the face of no
or not has bearing on several
clear
intent]
"Whether
a person is an
author
important prospective
imputed
aspects
of
to
Congress
a
the copyright ownership dating
purpose
to
prevent authors
from the sending of the
from divesting
their assignees
termination notice:'
of
proceeds
from
the
exploitation of derivative works by third licenses after the effective date of termination,
parties, effectively reversing what the parties the original writer would be able to collect the
had
expected their compromise
to entirety of any royalties due to writers for
accomplish."" 6 It may be that a court could licenses issued after the termination. If the
be persuaded that the situation of the name- name-only writers had their own music
only writer should be interpreted differently publishing companies, their companies would
because it is so clearly the result of a transfer stand in the same situation as Mills Musicthat resulted from unequal bargaining collecting only for pre-termination licenses.
positions.
On the other hand, the purpose of the
grant or license to the recording artist and IV. Statute of Limitations, Laches
producer is to encourage them to create the and Other Problems
derivative work. Under the "terms and
conditions" of the grant, the derivative work
A. Statute of Limitations
would be created and the artist or producer
The statute of limitations will
would be treated as co-writers. Should not they, undoubtedly be one of the defenses to an
too, be allowed to continue to collect royalties attempt by a songwriter to assert sole
because they created the derivative work? authorship through a termination action. The
More specifically, the Court clearly read the Copyright Act requires that "[n]o civil action
statute to require preservation of the "total shall be maintained under the provisions of this
contractual relationship."" 7 That includes the title unless it is commenced within three years
name-only authors' grant of rights to their after the claim accrued."1 8 In an infringement
publisher and their publisher's mechanical case, the ordinary interpretation is that the
license to the record company. Even if their three-year limit begins to run in an
publisher was different from that of the original infringement case "when the plaintiff knew or
writer, the transfer of rights to the name-only should have known of the infringement."" 9 In
writers ultimately became part of the rights that cases involving claims of ownership, the courts
the labels obtained to make the recordings. tend to view the accrual of the cause of action
Therefore, those would presumably also be as taking place upon the initial publication
preserved by the derivative works exception.
where copyright ownership and authorship
The best case scenario for the name-only may be claimed on the published copies. In
writers would then be much like that of the Zuill v. Shanahan, the Ninth Circuit held that
publisher in Mills Music. They would be an express repudiation of the status of plaintiffs
allowed to continue to collect their share of as co-authors of the Hooked on Phonics music
royalties for mechanical licenses issued prior started the three-year period running.2 0 The
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acts of repudiation included written and limitations of actions provisions to apply only
contractual offers to the plaintiffs, and the to remedies, not substantive rights. The court
copyright notice on published copies of Hooked examined the language from the Senate Report,
121
on Phonics, which plaintiffs had received.
which stated that some rights may be enforced
Unlike the situation in an infringement case collaterally even though the statute of
127
where additional infringing acts may occur for limitations for the remedy has already run.
years after an initial infringing act, thereby The Senate Report used the example of a
prolonging the period during which litigation mortgage foreclosure after the statute of
may be commenced, the court noted that "[a]n
limitations for enforcement of a debt had
infringement occurs every time the already run. The case of an author who has a
copyrighted work is published, but creation right of termination of transfers to oust a phony
does not."122 Because the plaintiffs in Zuill were co-author is in a similar vein. The Zuill court
not claiming copyright infringement, found no such collateral claim of right in that
subsequent acts could not cause the accrual of case, but Zuill was not a termination case.
new causes of action. In fact, they could not
Other courts have also held that those
have claimed infringement because co-owners wanting to assert co-authorship may be barred
of copyrights cannot be liable to each other for by the statute of limitations. In Merchant v.
infringement; each owns and may exercise the Levy, 128 the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff
rights in the work. 123 The court noted that this teen-aged writers were charged with notice
was not a case where plaintiffs claimed that that they were being denied credit as writers
Shanahan was not an author at all, but rather, upon attaining the age of majority in 1961. The
that they were co-authors. 24 In such instances, statute of limitations had long since run when
the court said,
"[iut
is
inequitable to
"It makes no sense to apply a
allow
the
three-year statute of limitations
putative
coowner to lie in
starting on the date of the
the weeds for
transfer, to a right that does not
years after his
claim has been
even exist until after 35 years
repudiated,
while
large
after the date of the transfer."
amounts
of
money
are
spent developing a market for the copyrighted they filed suit in 1987. This was the case even
material, and then pounce on the prize after it though they were under duress from 1969 until
has been brought in by another's effort."' 125 The possibly 1984, as they were threatened with
Ninth Circuit based its reasoning partially on death by the defendant because they were
129
the need for stability and predictability in asking about royalties.
copyright ownership, analogizing to the need
Stone v. Williams 3 ° involved a suit by
for stability in real property where the accrual the illegitimate daughter of Hank Williams to
of a cause of action by co-owners starts to run be declared an heir to his copyrights and
when they are dispossessed, and either may copyright renewals and to royalties earned
gain title by adverse possession if the other from Williams' compositions. The court
126
doesn't take action in a timely manner.
determined that Stone should have known of
The plaintiffs made an interesting claim her rights in the copyrights as early as 1979.'31
in Zuill that might apply to the case of an author Even though she did not take legal action until
trying to eliminate a phony co-author through 1985 the court said the statute of limitations
a termination of transfer. They claimed that did not bar her actions because she was
the statute of limitations should not bar their attempting to assert a right of ownership and
claim because Congress intended the not a remedy. 32 The court noted,
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establishment of one's status as a child
is necessary to maintain an action
alleging deprivation of renewal rights;
since a failure to satisfy such
prerequisites to bringing suit may be
cured and does not forever preclude
relief for infringement, by a parity of
reasoning, a failure to establish status
as a child does not forever preclude
relief for the invasion of renewal
rights.'3 3
The court went on to say, however, that the
accounting remedy could only take into account
royalties due no more than three years prior to
the filing of the suit.1 34 The Ninth Circuit
rejected the reasoning in Stone, calling it an
"idiosyncratic" case and finding a difference
between a claim of ownership based on status
as an author and one based on renewal rights
135
of heirs.
In contrast to these decisions stands
Goodman v. Lee, 1 36 where the Fifth Circuit
decided that Shirley Goodman, alleging that
she was a co-author of "Let the Good Times
Roll," could maintain an action for an
accounting under Louisiana law. The jury
determined that the statute had been tolled
because Goodman did not know, and should
not have known, until the copyright was
renewed in 1984 that Leonard Lee had listed
himself as sole author on the copyright
registration form. Then, after using federal law
to determine the question of authorship, the
court applied Louisiana Law regarding the
application for an accounting, which is a state
law remedy. That statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the party first demands
the accounting.
Termination cases should be treated
differently from those involving a situation
where an author seeks a declaration of their
status as co-author ab initio. Whether a person
is an author or not has bearing on several
important prospective aspects of the copyright
ownership dating from the sending of the
termination notice. First, only authors or their
heirs have a right to terminate a transfer. Thus,
if a songwriter made a transfer to an artist or
producer, essentially giving them a share of the
copyright by virtue of allowing them to claim
Spring 2005

author status, then that transfer should be
terminable under the statute. Furthermore,
whether the artist or producer is an author has
a bearing on the number of people required to
execute a termination. The statute requires a
majority of the authors who executed the grant
13 7 If
of a joint work to join in its termination.
an author is deceased at the time of termination,
that author's interest may be exercised by the
surviving widow or widower and children (or
grandchildren of a deceased child), or the
author's estate if none of the statutory successors
are alive. 38 As a result, it is important to know
who the authors are and what their shares of
ownership are, as these answers have direct
impact on the statutory right of termination.
In addition, once the notice of
termination is sent to the grantee or licensee,
the reclaimed rights vest on the date of the
service of the termination notice. 139 This
vesting is important to the determination of the
descent of rights in the event that one of those
sending the notice dies prior to the effective
date of termination. Those in whom the rights
vest may also negotiate with the terminated
grantee upon delivery of the notice, but not
with third parties until the effective date of
termination. 4 °
Since there is no statutory right of
termination until after 35 years after the
transfer, or up to 40 years if the transfer
involved the right of publication, the statute of
limitations should not apply. It makes no sense
to apply a three-year statute of limitations
starting on the date of the transfer to a right
that does not even exist until after 35 years after
the date of the transfer. Such a result would
render the termination provisions a nullity.
Furthermore, there is the equivalent of
limitation of actions for termination specifically
built into the statute. If the effective date of
termination does not fall within the allotted
five-year period and the notice of termination
is at least two, but no more than ten, years
before the effective date of termination, the
grant continues in effect. 141 The legislative
history clarifies further, "[t]his section means
that, if the agreement does not contain
provisions specifying its term or duration, and
the author has not terminated the agreement
under this section, the agreement continues for
the term of the copyrights subject to any right
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of termination under circumstances which may
142
be specified therein."

B. Laches
Laches is an equitable defense that
prevents a plaintiff from pursuing an action
where there has been a delay in asserting a right
or claim, where the delay was not excusable,
and where there was undue prejudice to the
defendant. 143 In the case of a statutory
termination of a transfer, there is no right until
after the passage of the required 35-40 years.
So long as the author exercised the right within
the stated period, there would be no
"unreasonable" delay because the statute itself
defines what is reasonable by establishing a
time frame within which the termination and
notice of termination may take place. Nor
would there be any undue prejudice to the
producer or artist who is simply relying on the
strength of their superior bargaining position
to enforce a transfer of rights that is
unremunerative for the actual author. Finally,
most courts would require that those asking
equitable relief come to the court with "clean
hands." 144 One who, in potential commission
of a fraudulent registration, falsely claims
authorship of a song is misleading the public
and the Copyright Office.

C. Fraudulent Registration
Claims
The Copyright Act criminalizes the act
of "knowingly making a false representation"
on a copyright registration application. 145 Such
actions are punishable by a fine of up to
$2,500.146 To date, however, whether a plaintiff
or defendant fraudulently entered information
on a copyright registration claim has seldom
impacted the outcome of a case. In Testa v.
Janssen,147 a false statement of authorship, later
corrected, did not prevent plaintiffs from
pursuing their claim of infringement by the
song "Keep on Singing" as recorded by Helen
Reddy. The court stated that authorship error
did not harm the defendant and did not relate
to the subject matter of the dispute. Nor does
such a misstatement on authorship affect the
1 48
validity of the registration.
Fraudulent representation on the registration form does not give rise to any separate
civil cause of action. 149 Specifically relevant to

this point is Ashton-Tate Corp. v.Ross,150 where
a failure to list the defendant as a co-author on
plaintiff's registration of a computer program
did not create any civil liability for plaintiff in a
counter-suit. The legislative history of the
fraudulent registration section gives no further
indication of any statutory intent beyond its
plain language.

V. Conclusion
Where a recording artist or producer
falsely claims authorship, intent must exist on
the part of both parties at the time the work is
created to enter into a joint authorship status if
there is to be joint authorship. In many cases
involving recording artists or producers listed
as co-authors, this intent does not exist because
the song was completed prior to pitching it to
the artist or producer. There must also be a
copyrightable contribution, or at least some
contribution of authorship, to the work by the
producer or artist. In most cases, there is no
contribution other than making some minor
changes to make the song suitable to the gender or singing style of the performer. The producer or artist is not an "author" of the song,
nor was there intent on the part of the original
songwriter to create a joint work. Thus, the
putative author fails both prongs of the definition of a joint work.
If the song is not a joint work, then there
must be some kind of permission given by the
actual author to record the song, or to be treated
as a joint author. In that case, there needs to be
a written transfer of rights; such a transfer can
be terminated. If there is no written agreement,
then the transfer can only be implied as a nonexclusive license because the statute requires a
writing for an exclusive license or other transfer
of ownership. Non-exclusive licenses can also
be terminated.
If the putative author protests that they
were supposed to have these rights for the life
of the copyright, that argument also fails. The
termination provisions permit an author to
terminate a transfer notwithstanding an
"agreement to the contrary." In the words of
the House Report, "[t]he right to take this action
cannot be waived in advance or contracted
away." '15 ' Finally, the situation where a
songwriter must give away part of the
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ownership of the copyright to get the song
recorded is exactly the type of unequal
bargaining situation that the termination
15 2
provisions sought to rectify.
By serving a proper termination notice
on the putative co-author, the actual
songwriters should be able to remove the
conferred status as "author" of the producer
or recording artist, thereby finally claiming
their rightful share of the future proceeds from
the recording, performances, and other uses
of the song.
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grant. Whether the recording agreement constitutes the grant of rights for works to be completed in future years is discussed below.
6'

65

66

17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3).
Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827,
(1998).

84 Id. at 292.
81Id. at 290-91.
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Cong.,

Ist Sess.
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469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985).
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17 U.S.C. § 304(d).

Marvel Characters, Inc., 310 F.3d at 290 (citing Mills Music, Inc., 469 U.S at 172-73).

68

Id. § 304(d)(2).
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69

Id. § 203 203(a).

70

Id. § 304(c)(1), (2).

71

Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c).
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Id. at 291 (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 15, §
11.02[A][2]).
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89

Id. at 291.

90

Id. at 292.

91

Id. (citations omitted).
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H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124. In the prerevision studies, Register of Copyrights Barbara
Ringer described the Renewal provisions of the
1909 law as "Congressional recognition that
author-publisher contracts must frequently be
made at a time when the value of the work is
unknown or conjectural and the author (regardless of his business ability) is necessarily in
a poor bargaining position." Barbara A. Ringer,
Renewal of Copyright, Studies Preparedfor the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Study No. 31, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 (1960).
The 1961 Register's Report urged Congress to
provide that assignments should not be effective for more than twenty years to compensate
for the relatively poor bargaining position of
authors who transfer rights for "less than a fair
share of the economic value of their works...."
Id. at 93, because renewal rights under the 1909
law had "largely failed to accomplish [this] primary purpose." Id. at 53. The legislative history of the 1909 law reveals that the primary
purpose of renewal was, indeed, just that. "It
not infrequently happens that the author sells
his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be
a great success and lives beyond the term of
twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it
should be the exclusive right of the author to
take the renewal term, and the law could be
framed as is the existing law, so that he could
not be deprived of that right." H.R. REP. No.
60-2222 (1909), S. REP. No. 60-1108, at 14
(1909). The first revision bill considered contained termination provisions. 1964 Copyright
Revision Bill, § 16. The first House Report, No.
2237 on H.R. 4347 in 1966 stated, in language
identical to the House Report on the present
law, "A provision of this sort is needed because
of the unequal bargaining position of authors,
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been exploited." Id. at 119; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
124. This history and purpose is thoroughly
reviewed and the same conclusion reached in
Mills Music. 469 U.S. at 173.
92

93

469 U.S. at 172-73.

14

H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124.

§ 8.01
supra note 15, §

95NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT

(2d ed. 2000); 3
11.01[B].

NIMMER,

96

3

97

Mills Music, Inc., 469 U.S. at 153-88.

NIMMER,

98Stewart

supra note 15, § 11.01[B], 11-4.

v. Abend, 450 U.S. 207, 207-56

(1990).
99 Id. at 224-28.
Id. at 224. The petitioners were attempting
to draw out of the provision § 304(c)(6)(A)
which allows the users of derivative works to
continue to use those works after the termination of the extended renewal period. Id. As
noted in Mills Music, those provisions are comparable to the provisions in § 203(b)(1). Mills
Music, Inc., 469 U.S. at 173 n. 39.
100

101Mills

Music, Inc., 494 U.S. at 173 n. 39 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476).
490 U.S. at 746. In Reid the discussion of
the "historic compromise" centered around the
work made for hire provisions of the Act.
102

103

17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A).

104

17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1).

Id. The entire provision reads: "A derivative
work prepared under authority of the grant
before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to
the preparation after the termination of other
derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work covered by the terminated grant."
105

106

469 U.S. at 563-75.

107

Id. at 153-54.

108

Id. at 175.

109 The Court actually recognized Snyder's interpretation of the legislative history on that
point. Id. at 176-77.
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110

Id. at 178.

111Id.
112

Id. at 169.

113

Id. at 172.

Justices White, Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun labeled the reading of the statute as
"awkward and clumsy." Id. at 180.
114

Howard B. Abrams, Who's Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985); Jessica D.
Litman, Copyright, Compromises and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); William
F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process:A
Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT.
L.J. 139 (1996).
115

116

Litman, supra note 115. at 902.

117

Mills Music, Inc., 469 U.S. at 169.

the copyright law may not represent very good
authority on Congress' intent in the 1976 version of the Act that was passed. However,
House Report No. 94-1476 (1976), generally
regarded as the most authoritative source of
legislative history on the 1976 Act, implies an
incorporation of that intent. H.R. REP. No. 941476, at 164. It states, "Section 507, which is
substantially identical with section 115 of the
present [1909] law, establishes a three-year statute of limitations for both criminal proceedings
and civil actions. The language of this section,
which was adopted by the act of September 7,
1957 (71 Stat. 633), represents a reconciliation
of views, and has therefore been left unaltered."
Id.
128

92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996).

Levy was in fact convicted of federal extortion charges for threatening the plaintiffs and
sentenced to ten years in prison. Id. at 53.
129

130

970 F.2d at 1046-47.

131

Id. at 1048.

132

Id. at 1051.

133

Id.

134

Id.

118 17 U.S.C. § 507(a).
119 See, e.g., Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366,
1369 (9th Cir. 1996); Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d
1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Meirick,
712 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1983); Armstrong
v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
120

80 F.3d at 1369.

121

Id. at 1368.

122

Id. at 1371.

123

Id. at 1369.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 1370-71.

126

Id. at 1370.

Id. at 1369-70, n.1 (citing S. Rep. No. 851014, at 1963 (1957)). It might be thought that
the 1957 Senate report on an amendment of

Zuill, 80 F.3d at 1370 (citing 1 NIMMER, supra
note 15, § 12.05 n.2.2).
135

136

78 F.3d 1007, 1015 (5th Cir. 1996).

137

17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).

138

Id.

139

Id. § 203(b)(2).

140

Id. § 203(b)(4).

141

Id. § 203(b)(6).
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H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 128.
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See, e.g., Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007, 1014.
The defense is also sometimes stated as a two
143
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part test requiring "lack of diligence" or "unreasonable delay" and prejudice to the defendants. E.g., Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd.,
91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The Supreme Court recognized that doctrine
in early admiralty cases, stating that claimants
in chancery cases "ought to come with clean
hands and a pure heart." United States v. The
Schooner Betsy, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443 (1807);
Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240
(1802).
144

145

17 U.S.C. § 506(e).

Nimmer comments, "[A]s crimes go, this
one barely qualifies for the label...."4 NIMMER,
supra note 15, § 15.03.
146

147

492 F. Supp. 198, 201 (W.D. Pa. 1980).

See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Toy Loft, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 174, 180 (N.D. Ga.
1980), (deeming a misstatement innocent and
not fraudulent), aff'd, 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir.
1982).
148

See, Too, Inc. v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc. 210
F. Supp. 2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Asia Entertainment v. Nguyen, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1183,
1186 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Harris Custom Builders
v. Hoffmeyer, 834 F. Supp. 256, 259 (N.D. Ill.
1993), Rev'd on other grounds, 92 F. 3d 517 (7th
Cir. 1996).
149

150

728 F. Supp. 597, 603 (N.D. Cal. 1989).

111 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 125.
152

Id. at 124.
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